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About	CTSC 
The	mission	of	the	Center	for	Trustworthy	Scientific	Cyberinfrastructure	(CTSC,	trustedci.org)	is	
to	improve	the	cybersecurity	of	NSF	science	and	engineering	projects,	while	allowing	those	
projects	to	focus	on	their	science	endeavors.		This	mission	is	accomplished	through	one-on-one	
engagements	with	projects	to	solve	their	specific	problems,	broad	education,	outreach	and	
training	to	raise	the	practice-of-security	across	the	community,	and	looking	for	opportunities	
for	improvement	to	bring	in	research	to	raise	the	state-of-practice. 
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 Executive	Summary 
 The	Science	Gateway	Platform	as	a	service	(SciGaP)	project	provides	middleware	services	for	science	communities.	SciGaP	has	several	cybersecurity	challenges	as	it	integrates	web,	campus	cyberinfrastructure,	and	cloud	technologies.	These	challenges	cover	a	broad	range	of	topics:	levels	of	trust	between	multiple	entities,	identity	management,	authentication	and	authorization,	software	assurance,	and	more.	The	CTSC-SciGaP	engagement	has	been	quite	unique.	Unlike	most	every	other	CTSC	engagement	which	have	had	relatively	short	durations	(few	months),	very	targeted	goal(s),	and	very	concentrated	effort;	the	SciGaP	engagement	has	been	more	open-ended,	with	a	longer	duration	(about	18	months),	but	very	infrequent	meetings.	One	reason	for	choosing	this	consulting-style	engagement	model	was	that	the	SciGaP	project	had	only	recently	begun	when	the	engagement	started,	so	CTSC	staff	made	themselves	available	over	time	as	the	SciGaP	project	started	up.	The	engagement	has	clarified	security	challenges,	generated	actionable	advice,	and	produced	multiple	reports	that	should	be	useful	for	general	security	issues	for	the	broader	NSF	science	community. 
 1		Introduction A	high-level	diagram	of	a	science	gateway	[1],	[2]	architecture	is	shown	in	Figure	1.	In	a	typical	use	case,	a	user/scientist	accesses	a	gateway	from	a	browser,	authenticates,	and	creates/submits	a	computational/data	task	or	workflow.	The	gateway	middleware	orchestrates	the	execution	of	the	task/workflow	on	one	or	more	resources	that	the	user	is	authorized	to	use,	hiding	much	of	the	complexity	from	the	user.	
 Figure	1.	Science	gateway	diagram. 
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 The	Science	Gateway	Platform	as	a	service	(SciGaP,	scigap.org)	project,	depicted	in	Figure	2,		is	a	hosted	service	that	provides	common	middleware	functionality	for	multiple	gateway	servers	and	“thick”	clients	[3]	simultaneously.	SciGaP	provides	software	development	kits	(SDKs;	in	multiple	languages)	that	help	gateway	developers	use	its	application	programming	interface	(API). 
 
 Figure	2.	SciGaP	diagram 
 There	will	be	multiple	entities	that	need	to	interact	in	SciGaP:		individual	users,	system	administrators	(for	the	servers	and	resources),	domain	science	communities,	other	services	(e.g.	for	authentication,	data	movement),	etc.	From	a	security	perspective,	this	brings	us	to	the	next	topic:	trust.	
 2		Trust	Models Trust	models	“describe	ways	in	which	organizations	can	obtain	the	levels	of	trust	needed	to	form	partnerships,	collaborate	with	other	organizations,	share	information,	or	receive	information	system/security	services.”		(p.	G1-G2	of	[4]).	In	the	context	of	science	gateways,	they	describe	how	the	science	gateway	and	the	resource	provider	establish	trust	such	that	the	resource	provider	is	willing	to	provide	services	to	the	science	gateway	on	behalf	of	that	science	gateway’s	user	community. 
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 The	NIST	800-39	report	[4]	goes	on	to	describe	a	variety	of	trust	models;	in	this	document	we	will	focus	on	two	trust	models:	brokered	trust	and	transitive	trust	as	described	in	[5].	Brokered	trust	(Figure	3)	is	when	a	trust	relationship	is	created	through	a	trusted	third	party.	In	the	context	of	XSEDE,	an	example	of	brokered	trust	is	when	a	project	PI	requests	account	creation	for	members	of	their	project	team	[6].	XSEDE	grants	these	requests	because	of	their	relationship	with	a	principal	investigator	(PI),	and	then	establishes	a	direct	relationship	with	the	project	member. 
 
 Figure	3.	Brokered	trust	model	with	resource	provider	establishing	relationships	with	members	of	a	PI’s	project	through	the	PI	who	acts	as	a	broker	to	establish	the	relationship. Brokered	trust	in	science	gateways	comes	about	when	a	gateway	user	has	a	relationship	(an	account	typically)	with	a	resource	provider	(RP)	and	utilizes	the	science	gateway	as	an	interface	to	access	that	account.	While	the	gateway	is	trusted	by	both	parties	in	that	circumstance	(e.g.,	it	may	pass	through	and	have	access	to	credentials),	the	primary	relationship	is	between	the	user	and	the	resource	provider1. Transitive	trust	(Figure	4)	is	the	relationship	between	communities,	science	gateways	and	resource	providers	as	described	in	[7].	In	this	case,	the	science	gateways	serve	as	intermediaries	in	the	relationship	such	that	there	are	really	three	trust	relationships:	one	between	the	community	served	by	the	science	gateway	and	the	gateway,	one	between	the	gateway	and	the	resource	provider,	and	then	the	resulting	relationship	between	the	community	and	the	resource	provider	that	results	from	the	combination	of	the	first	two	relationships. 
                                                
1 Technically, this would be what [4] describes as a Hybrid Model. 
Project 
Member RP 
PI 
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 Figure	4.	Transitive	trust	approach	with	the	science	gateway	managing	its	community	and	resource	providers	trusting	it	to	do	so.		No	direct	trust	relationship	between	community	and	the	resource	provider	exists. 
 As	described	in	[8],	there	are	a	variety	of	reasons	why	transitive	trust	may	be	preferred	for	a	given	set	of	partners,	including	having	dynamic	community	membership	with	complicated	roles,	and	community	that	span	multiple	resource	providers.	The	same	reference	describes	that	transitive	trust	tends	to	be	more	readily	achieved	when	the	missions	of	the	resource	provider	and	community	align,	they	have	an	established	history	and	relationship,	and	when	the	community	has	suitable	experience	and	resources	in	managing	their	community	and	services	to	give	the	resource	provider	confidence	in	their	ability	to	do	so.	
 3		Identity	and	Access	Management Much	of	our	engagement	has	dealt	with	the	topic	of	identity	and	access	management	(IAM).	SciGaP	will	be	responsible	for	managing	user	and	community	identities,	authentication	and	authorization	to	resources,	and	account	management	for	those	resources	[9].	IAM	has	been	a	challenging,	evolving	topic	for	science	gateways	ever	since	they	began	over	ten	years	ago.	The	IAM	ecosystem	involves	a	variety	of	authentication	concepts,	e.g.,	username/password,	SSH,	SSL,	X.509	certificates,	SAML,	OAuth,	OpenID	Connect,	etc.	[10]	and	there	are	a	variety	of	software	packages	and	services	that	have	provided	IAM	solutions	for	gateways	[7],	[11]–[13].	During	our	engagement,	CTSC	cautioned	the	SciGaP	team	about	the	challenges	of	writing	and	maintaining	their	own	“credential	store”	[9].	Partly	based	on	this	advice,	SciGaP	researched	available	options	and	determined	the	WSO2	Identity	Server	(WSO2	IS)	(http://wso2.com/products/identity-server/)	would	be	a	good	choice.	CTSC	and	SciGaP	jointly	reviewed	the	documentation	for	WSO2	IS	and	determined	that	it	would	likely	be	an	adequate	solution	for	their	identity	management	needs.	In	addition	to	the	IAM	functionality	it	provides,	other	benefits	include:		1)	it	is	open	source,	and	2)	the	SciGaP	team	is	acquainted	with	the	WSO2	team	and	therefore	it	is	likely	SciGaP	can	get	customized	functionality	in	WSO2	IS. 
 We	note	that	CTSC	makes	available	several	resources	that	address	IAM	(http://trustedci.org/iam/). 
Comm-
unity RP 
Science 
Gateway 
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4	OAuth	Best	Practices Because	SciGaP	considers	OAuth	to	be	highly	desirable	for	authentication	-	from	a	usability	perspective,	we	include	some	background	and	best	practices	that	have	been	only	partially	in	our	other	reports	[14][3][10]. Resource	Owner	Password	Credentials	Grant,	as	defined	by	Section	4.3	of	[15],	is	intended	for	situations	where	a	OAUTH	client	is	not	capable	of	other,	more	secure	workflows	described	in	RFC	6749.	It	is	in	effect	a	compromise	to	allow	legacy	clients,	or	other	situations	where	the	normal	OAUTH	workflows	cannot	be	used,	to	still	operate	and	do	so	more	securely	than	persistently	storing	credentials.	As	the	security	considerations	section	(10.7)	of	RFC	6749	describes,	the	client	must	be	trusted	to	not	misuse	the	credentials	(e.g.	ask	for	more	authority	than	is	intended)	and	not	to	intentionally	or	accidentally	persist	them	in	some	manner	(e.g.	in	a	log).	 Whether	or	not	the	use	of	Resource	Owner	Password	Credentials	Grant	is	suitable	for	a	particular	situation	will	depend	on	the	details	of	the	situation:	the	importance	of	the	client	being	enabled,	the	level	of	trust	in	the	client,	and	the	risk	tolerance	of	the	parties	involved.	In	the	authors’	experience,	situations	exist	where	its	use	would	be	warranted.	Its	inclusion	in	RFC	6749	would	imply	that	the	RFC	authors	(and	associated	working	group	members)	agree.	(We	note	the	security	section	states	that	its	use	SHOULD	be	minimized,	which	is	a	not	as	strong	a	statement	as	could	have	been	made	to	avoid	its	use	-	e.g.	they	could	have	said	it	“MUST	be	avoided.”) SciGaP’s	two	use	cases	for	wanting	this	type	of	OAuth	grant	were:	1)	desktop	applications,	i.e.	thick	clients,	and	2)	gateways	that	wish	to	avoid	having	users	be	redirected	to	a	(unknown)	site	for	credentials.	A	specific	example	of	the	second	use	case	is: The	SEAGrid	gateway	(seagrid.org)	has	an	existing	community	of	users	who	know	and	trust	SEAGrid	services.	When	SEAGrid	adopts	SciGaP	for	IAM,	they	would	like	to	avoid	the	OAuth	“Authorization	Code	Grant”	that	would	redirect	them	to	the	SciGaP	identity	management	page.	SEAGrid	users	may	not	know/trust	the	SciGaP	service	and	might	be	reluctant	to	use	it. If	this	grant	type	is	used,	one	potential	risk	mitigation	that	could	be	applied	is	to	use	short-lived	(or	even	single	use)	passwords	to	reduce	the	trust	in	the	client	to	not	store	or	lose	confidentiality	of	those	passwords	(e.g.	as	described	in	[16]). We	recommend	establishing	a	written	agreement	with	the	client	that: 1. Describes	the	intended	use	of	credentials	it	receives	(or	how	that	intended	use	will	be	conveyed);	
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2. Specifies	the	client	will	not	use	the	credentials	other	than	they	are	intended	or	otherwise	disclose	them;	and	3. Specifies	the	client	will	delete	credentials	once	its	immediate	need	for	them	has	been	satisfied.			Trust	in	the	client	could	also	be	augmented	with	an	audit	of	its	implementation	(granted,	this	is	a	labor	intensive	process),	or	ongoing	or	occasional	checking	that	it	is	adhering	to	an	agreed	to	policy	(e.g.	the	client	will	demonstrate	logs	that	show	how	credentials	are	being	used	and	deleted).		5		Software	Assurance SciGaP	is	comprised	of	multiple	software	packages.	Apache	Airavata	(https://airavata.apache.org/)	[17]	and	Apache	Thrift	(https://thrift.apache.org/)	are	two	of	the	most	relevant.	Airavata	is	the	middleware	that	orchestrates	the	workflows	from	the	gateways.	Thrift	is	a	software	framework	that	uses	an	interface	definition	language	(IDL)	to	generate	code	for	cross-language	client-server	communication.	During	our	engagement,	CTSC	analyzed	Thrift	and	created	a	best	practices	report,	using	the	Evernote	(https://evernote.com)	service	as	a	case	study	[14].	 
 As	in	any	software	development	project,	software	assurance	is	vital	to	improve	security.	In	addition	to	developers	being	mindful	of	best	practices	for	software	security	engineering	as	they	write	their	code,	it	is	also	possible	to	perform	programmatic	static	analysis	on	large	code	bases	(multiple	files).		During	our	engagement,	CTSC	demonstrated	one	free	online	service	that	does	this:	the	Software	Assurance	Marketplace	(SWAMP;	https://continuousassurance.org/).	SWAMP	can	analyze	code	in	several	different	languages,	using	multiple	static	analysis	tools.	Figure	5	shows	how	one	begins	an	assessment	of	a	snapshot	of	the	Airavata	code.	Essentially,	a	user	uploads	a	software	package,	specifies	the	build	process,	and	selects	a	tool	to	perform	the	static	analysis.	When	the	analysis	is	complete,	results	can	either	be	viewed	in	the	browser	or	downloaded	for	further	processing. 
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	  Figure	5.	Setting	up	an	assessment	(static	analysis)	of	Airavata	in	SWAMP. 
 
 
Results (using an early version of the Airavata code) listed several “weaknesses” 
(http://cwe.mitre.org/) that included: 
 
CWE-398 : Indicator of Poor Code Quality 
CWE-547: Use of Hard-coded, Security-relevant Constants 
CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value 
CWE-571: Expression is Always True 
CWE-581: Object Model Violation: Just One of Equals and Hashcode Defined 
CWE-584: Return Inside Finally Block 
CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use ('Unused Variable') 
CWE-478: Missing Default Case in Switch Statement 
CWE-495: Private Array-Typed Field Returned From A Public Method 
 The	point	of	this	demonstration	was	not	to	suggest	that	SciGaP	developers	fix	every	single	weakness	in	the	code.	The	point	was	to	make	them	aware	that	such	tools	do	exist,	are	relatively	easy	to	use,	and	can	indeed	help	improve	the	security	of	the	project.	
 6	Conclusion The	SciGaP-CTSC	engagement	was	unique	in	many	ways:	the	duration	of	the	engagement	(unusually	long;	about	18	months),	the	frequency	of	meetings	(very	infrequent,	but	when	
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we	did	meet	it	was	in-depth),	and	the	breadth	of	the	security	topics	that	were	covered.	Through	face-to-face	meetings,	email	correspondence,	formal	reports,	and	a	peer-reviewed	paper,	CTSC	was	able	to	provide	the	SciGaP	project	with	a	better	understanding	and	guidance	on	relevant	security	topics,	including:	trust	models,	authentication	and	authorization,	identity	and	access	management,	and	software	assurance.	In	addition,	we	provided	best	practices	for	their	use	of	the	Apache	Thrift	software,	demonstrated	static	analysis	for	the	Apache	Airavata	software,	and	commented	on	the	pros/cons	of	using	the	WSO2	Identity	Server	software.	We	firmly	believe	our	engagement	will	lead	to	a	more	secure	SciGaP	service. 
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